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I.

The Court Should Address the Merits of the Issues Raised in Peterson's
Appeal Because Those Issues are Properly Before the Court and Have Been
Appropriately Preserved for Appeal.
A.

Peterson's Appeal Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Peterson has substantially complied with the briefing requirements of Rule 24.
Hall argues that Peterson's appeal brief fails to satisfy the 1) citation and 2) marshaling of
vJ

evidence requirements outlined in the appellate rules of procedure. The following
information shows that Hall's arguments are flawed and that Peterson's brief satisfies

~

both the citation and marshaling requirements of Rule 24.
The purpose of Rule 24 briefing requirements is to focus the briefs promoting
more accuracy and efficiency. "[B]riefs must comply with the briefing, requirements
sufficiently to 'enable [the Court] to understand what particular errors were allegedly
made, where in the record those errors can be found, and why, under applicable

v;jj

authorities, those errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other relief."' Burns v.

Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quotingDemetropoulos v.
Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). An issue is not adequately briefed
when "analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument
to the reviewing court." Red Bridge Capital, LLC v. JAR Family Inv. Co., 319 P.3d 754,
757 (Utah Ct. App. 2014). "[T]he appellate court assesses the adequacy of a brief not as a
matter of gauging procedural compliance with the rule, but as a necessary component of
its evaluation of the case on its merits." Id. The citations and marshalled evidence in
Peterson's brief set forth the errors that were made, where those errors can be found in

I
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the record, and why those errors should be reversed. As such, it does not place a burden
of research or argument on the Court.

1.

Peterson Has Substantially Complied With Rule 24's Citation
Requirements.

Peterson's brief substantially complies with the citation requirements of Rule
24(e), which states that "[r]eferences shall be made to the pages of the original record."
Peterson's references to the record did include the pages of the relevant sections of the
record. [See generally Peterson Opening Brief ("OB")]. However, instead of referring to
the sequential number of the cover page of the transcript, Peterson named the transcript.
tv

Id. So, rather than "R.822 at 25:1-9", Peterson referenced "Trial Tr. Vol. 3, 25:1-9".
While Peterson's prior reference method may not be the most preferred method of
reference, it accomplishes the purpose of the rule, which is to identify the location of the
reference so the Court can quickly locate the referenced material. See Carrier v. Salt Lake

Cty., 104 P.3d 1208, 1213-14 (Utah 2004) ("Although we certainly disapprove of the
County's incorrect record citations, we are nevertheless able to adequately navigate the
record with the citations provided"). Accordingly, Peterson's brief substantially complies
with the citation requirements of Rule 24(e).
Peterson also substantially complies with the requirement to include a "citation to
the record showing that the issue was preserved at the trial court", as required under Rule
24(a)(5)(A). "An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been presented to the district
court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on it". Patterson v.
Patterson, 266 P.3d 828, 832 (Utah 2011). In his brief, Peterson specifically identified

2
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that the issues raised on appeal were preserved in his motion for directed verdict, trial
presentation, motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and objection to the
proposed judgment. [OB at 3]. More specifically, the respective issues were preserved
with particularity as follows:
1. Issue #1: At the close of Hall's case-in-chief, did the trial court correctly
determine there was competent evidence to support a verdict for easement by
vJ

estoppel? This issue was properly preserved in the following: 1) Peterson's oral
motion for directed verdict at trial [R.821 at 165: 11-168: 10, 178: 1-179: 10, 181 :6182: 11]; 2) Peterson's objection to proposed judgment [R.681 at 2-3]; 3)
Peterson's memorandum in support of defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict [R.711 at 3-9]; and 4) Peterson's reply to
memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict [R. 781 at 4-6].
VI

2. Issue#2: Did Hall present sufficient evidence for reasonable minds to reach the
conclusion that Hall was entitled to an easement by estoppel? This issue was
properly preserved in the following: 1) Peterson's oral motion for directed verdict
at trial [R.821 at 165: 11-168: 10, 178: 1-179: 10, 181 :6-182: 11]; 2) Peterson's
closing arguments at trial [R.822 at 138:15-144:4]; 3) Peterson's objection to

~

proposed judgment [R.681 at 2-3]; 4) memorandum in support of defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict [R.711 at 3-9]; and 5) Peterson's
reply to memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict [R. 781 at 4-6].
3
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3. Issue#3: Even if the award of an easement by estoppel was proper, did the trial
court correctly identify the scope and location of the easement? This issue was
properly preserved in Peterson's objection to proposed judgment [R.681 at 2-4].
4. Issue#4: Even if the award of an easement by estoppel was proper, was the trial
court's judgment correct regarding the benefited parcels? This issue was properly
preserved in Peterson's objection to proposed judgment [R.681 at 2-4].
As these references to the record indicate, the trial court had an opportunity to rule on
each of these issues that were presented by Peterson. Thus, Peterson has substantially
complied with the Rule 24(a)(5)(A) requirement to show each of the issues were
preserved at the trial court.
Peterson's brief also substantially complies with the requirement that the
Statement of the Case include citations to the record for "[a]ll statements of fact and
references to the proceedings below." Rule 24(a)(7). _Whileitis true-that Peterson did not
cite to the record in the Statement of Case, Peterson clearly did cite to the record in
Statement of Facts. [OB at 4-7]. Thus, Peterson has made clear where the statements and
facts were to be found in the record. Most importantly, Peterson clearly sets forth the
errors that were made, where those errors can be found in the record, and why those
errors should be reversed. So Peterson's brief should be reviewed on the merits, and not
on any arguable briefing deficiencies.

4
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2.

Peterson Has Satisfied Rule 24's Marshalling of Evidence
Requirement.

Peterson's appeal substantially complies with the requirement under Rule 24(a)(9)
that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding". A party satisfies the marshalling requirement by
"presenting all of the evidence supporting the findings and showing that despite the
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are
not supported by substantial evidence." Peterson Hunting v. Labor Com 'n, 269 P .3d 998
(Utah Ct. App. 2012). However, the marshaling requirement does not require the
~

appellant to present "every scrap of competent evidence" in a "comprehensive and
fastidious order". State v. Nielsen, 326 P.3d 645, 653 (Utah 2014). When reviewing
compliance with the requirement to marshal, "[t]he focus should ~eon the merits, not on
some arguable deficiency in the appellant's duty of marshaling." Id. Here, Peterson
vJ

satisfied the marshalling requirements of Rule 24. In the Statement of Facts section of
Peterson' brief, Peterson marshals over four pages of facts, including at least thirty-five
individual references to evidence in the record. [OB at 4-7]. These facts are the basis for
the trial court's findings and fulfill Peterson's marshaling burden. Accordingly, this
Court's attention should be directed to the merits of the appeal, not whether there is any
perceived lack of marshaled facts.

It should be noted that there is "no need for an appellant to marshal the evidence
when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as
~

factual determinations." Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah Ct. App.

5
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1991 ). In such a case, the appellant can "simply argue the legal insufficiency of the
court's findings as framed". Id. While the Woodward standard was stated in relation to an
appeal of the court's findings, it can be applied by analogy to a situation where the
evidence itself is insufficient. That is currently the case. Peterson has marshaled what
evidence there was available to be marshaled. Any claimed deficiency in Peterson's
marshaling is actually a result of the insufficiency of the relevant evidence on the record.

B.

Peterson Preserved at the Trial Court the Issues of Insufficiency of
Evidence Relating to the Easement by Estoppel Claim and Scope and
Location of Easement.
Easement by Estoppel Claim.

Peterson preserved the issue that there was not sufficient evidence to support the
easement by estoppel claim through his motion for directed verdict and his JNOV
motion. "In order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial
c;9urt in su~h_c1way tli~jtlle trial ~ourt pas @_9PP~Q!U!11!!Y1Q_1].1Je op__tbe. issue."

Nonnandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44 ,I23, 215 P.3d 152, 159. The
information herein shows that Peterson presented and gave the trial court the opportunity
to rule on the issue of insufficiency of evidence in his motion for directed verdict and his
JNOV motion.
Hall's brief argues that Peterson can only address on appeal the reasonable
reliance element of the easement by estoppel claim as it relates to Hall, David Sorenson,
Ron Smith, Lula Jean Thomas, and Gary Thomas. This argument fails for multiple
reasons. First, such argument is inconsistent with the Record. The Record unquestionably
shows that Peterson's motion for directed verdict related to all of the elements of
6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

easement by estoppel. [R.821 at 165: 10-168: 10, 173 :3-177 :24, 178: 1-182: 11,183 :20185: l 2, 188:1-23]. While Peterson may not have specifically addressed in detail each of
the elements of easement by estoppel in his motion for directed verdict, there was a
general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presented for Hall's claim of
easement by estoppel. [R.821 at 165:10-168:10, 173:3-177:24, 178:1-182:11,183:20185:12, 188:1-23]. Furthermore, not only does the Record make clear that Peterson's
directed verdict motion was for the entire easement by estoppel claim, it also makes clear
that Hall knew that Peterson's motion applied to the entire easement by estoppel claim as
Hall's response to the motion addressed all of the easement by estoppel elements. Id.
Because the Record shows that Peterson raised the insufficiency of evidence issue as it
relates to all of the easement by estoppel elements in his motion for directed verdict and
Hall's response to such motion addressed all of the easement by estoppel elements,
Peterson properly preserved the issue for appeal.
The next reason Hall's argument fails on this issue is because he argues an
incorrect standard for preservation. Nowhere in Utah law does it state that a party has to
v;i

specifically argue every element of a claim in a directed verdict motion to preserve an
issue for appeal. As set forth above, the standard for preserving an issue for appeal is to
present the issue to the trial court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule
on the issue. The Record in this matter shows that Peterson raised the insufficiency of
evidence issue relating to the easement by estoppel claim in such a manner that the trial
court could rule on the issue. Therefore, the entire easement by estoppel claim and its
elements have been preserved for appeal.
7
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Finally, Peterson preserved the entire easement by estoppel claim in its JNOV
motion. [R. 711 :3-9]. This motion addressed all of the easement by estoppel elements as
they relate to this case.
Notwithstanding the evidence in the Record, Hall's brief raises flawed arguments
and supports such arguments with inapplicable case law. Hall's brief states, "[t]he failure
to include an issue in a rule 50(a) motion bars the court from considering the issue on
appeal, and raising the issue for the first time in a rule 50(b) motion does not preserve the
issue for appeal." [Appellee's Brief ("AB") at 1]. In support of this statement, Hall cites

Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). This
argument by Hall not only ignores the fact that Peterson's motion for directed verdict did
raise the insufficiency of evidence issue relating to the entire easement by estoppel claim,
it also is supported by inapplicable law. Estate of Covington does not even deal with Rule
50(a)_or 50(b)inanyway.1d. ___ _
Additionally, a review of the other cases cited by Hall regarding his Rule 50
arguments reveals that those cases do not support Hall's Rule 50 arguments. In Pollesche

v. Transamerican Ins. Co., the record therein showed that a motion for a directed verdict
was never made. 497 P.2d 236,238 (Utah 1972). The appellant therein was thus
foreclosed from later moving for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or from
challenging on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. The Pollesche facts are
substantially different than the present facts. Here, Peterson did make a motion for a
directed verdict, which was in fact argued extensively by both patties. [R. 821 at 165: 10~

168: 10, 173 :3-182: 11, 183 :20-185: 12]. Thus, the Pollesche case is clearly distinguished
8
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from our case. Similar flaws are found in other cases cited by Hall. Hansen v. Stewart,
761 P.2d 14, 15n.1 (Utah 1988) ("failure to make a motion for directed verdict forecloses
consideration of a later motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and any
appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence"); Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n,
470 P.2d 393, 396 (Utah 1970) ("when there is no request for a directed verdict, the
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict is not reviewable").
(j

Again, the appellants in Hall's cited cases never even moved for a directed verdict,
whereas Peterson did move for, and address in detail, a motion for directed verdict.
~

Setting aside the irrelevant cases cited by Hall, it becomes clear that Peterson has
adequately preserved the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence and that issue should be
considered on its merits.

2.

Scope and Location of Easement.

The issues raised by Peterson regarding the scope and location of the awarded
easement and the parcels benefited thereby are not barred by the invited error doctrine.
Hall claims that Peterson "invited the error" by failing to object to the special verdict
form. [AB at 15-17]. As support, Hall cites Smith v. Simas, which rightfully found that
failing to object to a special verdict form at trial precludes further appellate review of the
special verdict form. 324 P.3d 667 (Utah 2014). But Smith v. Simas is easily
distinguishable from the issue raised by Peterson. Here, Peterson does not raise the issue
of an error in the special verdict form, but instead an error in the entered judgment. That
judgment went well beyond the verdict returned by the jury. The Jury made no finding as
41£}

to the scope and location of the easement or as to which parcels of property were
9
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benefited by the awarded easement. [R.822 at 193: 10-194: 14]. Nevertheless, Hall
proposed a judgment that went beyond the jury verdict in determining the scope of
easement and the benefitted parcels. [R.755]. Despite Peterson's objections, the district
court entered the defective judgment as proposed by Hall. [R.766]. Peterson did not set
up any error. The error was introduced by Hall's proposed judgment. The scope of that
judgment lacks any evidentiary support from the record. Therefore, the trial court's
judgment should be vacated and remanded to the trial court for further determination
regarding the scope and location of the easement and the parcels benefited thereby.

II.

Hall Attempts to Support the Trial Court's Order by Relying on
Impermissible Speculation and Conjecture.
As there was insufficient evidence at trial to support the trial court's ruling, Hall is

now attempting to use impermissible speculation and conjecture to preserve such ruling.
The limited evidence in support of the jury's findings is the result of the evidence being
"so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." See
4s,

Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998).
A.

Facts Marshaled by Hall.

In Hall's effort to marshal evidence, he routinely mischaracterizes the facts
presented at trial and reaches inferences unsupported by the testimony cited. While Hall
is entitled to all favorable inferences, he "is not entitled to build a case on the gossamer
threads of whimsy, speculation and conjecture." Giles v. Mineral Resources
International, Inc., 338 P.3d 825 (Utah Ct. App. 2014). The "evidence" marshaled by
HaII to support the verdict relies almost entirely upon "a degree of speculation and
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conjecture that renders its finding a guess or mere possibility." See id. Such findings are
"infirm because [they are] not based on the evidence" presented at trial. Id.
The following identifies and responds to the alleged facts Hall marshaled to
support his position:
Alleged Fact:

Diversified was a partnership including Thomas, her husband,

and Dwayne Watson. [AB at 21 ].

Respo1tse:

This "fact" is entirely unsupported by the evidence. Thomas and her

husband entered into a business venture with Dwayne Watson, investing money in his
company. Watson's company was Diversified Marketing. [R.821 at 114:1-14].
Alleged Fact:

Diversified originally acquired approximately 1550 acres of

property to the south of Peterson's property from Neil Jorgenson. [AB at 21].

Respo1tse:

No dispute.

Alleged Fact:

Diversified developed the property it acquired from

Jorgenson and subdivided it into "little lots." [AB at 21].

Respo1tse:

This "fact" is unsupported by the Record. The testimony was simply

that a developer came in and sold "all these little lots." [R.822 at 30:23-32:23].
Alleged Fact:

Diversified sold the smaller lots to other parties, including

Hall's predecessors-in-interest. [AB at 21].
vJ

Response:

The evidence supports that Diversified was the prior owner of

Thomas' and Smith's properties. [R.820 at 137:4-22; 138:2-20; R. 821 at 49:15-22].
There is no evidence that Diversified previously owned Gobel's two parcels of property.

11
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Alleged Fact:

Diversified was developing the property and selling

individual lots. [AB at 21].

Response:

This statement is unsupported by the evidence. The facts Hall cited

to make such inference is as follows: "[The bulldozer] was not on my property. It was on
an area which Diversified had said was they're selling these lots." [R.821 at 58:19-21].
Such statement is speculative at best to support the statement Diversified was developing
the property.

Alleged Fact:

The deeds transferring individual parcels from Diversified to

Hall's predecessors-in-interest reserved certain right-of-way rights necessary for
Diversified's development. [AB at 21].

Response:

Smith and Thomas' deeds simply excepted a right-of-way for ingress

and egress over and across the said property at a location to be determined by Diversified.
_[R.820 atJ39:9!"." 17].-No reasonable inference of development can be made.from-such exception.

Alleged Fact: Diversified built a fifteen-foot wide road to extend access to the
smaller lots it was selling, including the individual parcels now owned by Hall. [AB at
22].

Response:

This "fact" is unsupported by admissible evidence. All citations to

the record are to the hearsay testimony of Kyle Hall. [R.820 at 145:12-15, 155:22-161:7,
162:2-7, 205:2-4, 210:23-211:4, 216:24-218:4, 223:24-224:6]. Such testimony is
unreliable, as Hall was not even born at the time the spur road was allegedly built. [R.820
at 132:2-1 0].
12
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Alleged Fact:

The evidence at trial did not definitely establish when

Diversified built the spur road. [AB at 22].
Response:

It is correct that the evidence did not definitively establish when the

spur road was built. However, the "fact" that Diversified built the Road is mere
speculation.
Alleged Fact:

The road was built for the specific purpose of providing

I.;)

access to Diversified's development, including the lots now owned by Hall. [AB at 22].
Response:

Jared Peterson, Hall's nephew, testified that the Road was obviously

put there to access the property. [R.821 at 157:19-24]. However, the "fact" that
Diversified built the Road and had a "development" is mere speculation.
Alleged Fact:

Diversified used heavy machinery to construct the road,

including, among other types of machinery, fixed blade bulldozers, track hoe bucket
machines, and excavators. [AB at 23].
Response:

This "fact" is unsupported by the evidence. The testimony of Jared

Peterson was that quite a few machines could be used to make the cuts and fills seen on
the spur road including fix blade bulldozers, track hoe bucket machines and excavators,
not that all such machinery was used. [R.821 at 150:23-151 :3, 158:9-14]. Furthermore,
there is no evidence to support that Diversified built the spur road.
Alleged Fact:

Diversified brought heavy machinery up to the property for

the purpose of further developing it. [AB at 23].
01

Response:

This "fact" is unsupported. Smith testified that Diversified said they

would build a clubhouse south of his property and they bulldozed a short section of an
13
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area south of his property. [R.821 at 54:5-14]. However, he did not know how far south.
The testimony does not establish that Diversified used the Peterson Road to get the
bulldozer to the identified location.

Alleged Fact:

Real estate agents and prospective purchasers of Diversified's

property frequently used the road during [the '60s and '70s]. [AB at 23].

Response:

This "fact" is entirely unsupported by the evidence. Although Mr.

Johansen never testified that he saw people from out of state using the Road, such
testimony would be irrelevant, as it does not support Hall's proposition. [R.820 at
188: 10-19]. Further, Johansen testified that he did not see other vehicles using the Road
in the '70s. [R.820 at 188:20-23].
The testimony of Sandra Vincent clearly does not support Hall's proposition as
she only used the Road between '91 and '95. [R.820 at 200:9-201 :25]. Hall next relies
upon the testimony of Lennie Seely_ to support his proposition._Although Seely_ does _____ _
testify that he saw people using the Road in the '60s and '70s, such testimony is
unreliable as he later testifies that he went up the Road in the 50's. [R.821 at 12:25-13:8,
18:4-16]. Further, Seely stated he graduated high school in '62, entered the military in
'63 and after returning from the military he did not use the Road until the '80s. [R.821 at
18:8-19:14]. It is undisputed that the Road across the Peterson Property did not exist until
'65. [R. 821 at 163:20-24]. Thus, Seely could not have been testifying about the correct
road and could not have seen others use the Road in the '60s and '70s.
Mr. Sorensen did testify that he visited [his] property with a vehicle. However,
such statement does not support Hall's proposition. In fact, it was Sorensen's testimony
14
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that when he went to the property with his real estate agent they hiked up to the property.
[R.821 at 34: 15-35:3].
The testimony of Rex Hall and Christine Hall does not support the claim, as they
testified that their use of the Road was pretty much recreational and the Hall family did
not own property on Mount Pleasant until 1977. [R.801 at 71:24-72:7, 86:6-18].
Furthermore, the Road did not access said property.
Lastly, the testimony of Mr. Matthews does not support Hall's proposition. At no
point did Matthews testify that he went to the property with a real estate agent. Rather, he
stated he went to the property with a group of five or six other owners of property. [R.821
at 140:22-141 :21].

Alleged Fact:

Respo11se:

Mr. Smith drove to his lot before purchasing it. [AB at 26].

Smith was unable to state whether or not he had purchased the

property prior to visiting it. [R.821 at 57:22-58:2].

Alleged Fact:

Diversified was unable to repay the money that the Thomas' s

invested, and instead deeded three parcels of land in the property at issue in lieu of
repayment. [AB at 26].

Respo1tse:

Only two of the parcels deeded to the Thomas's are at issue in this

matter. The third was lost in a tax sale years ago. [R. 821 at 119: 1-9].

B.

There Was Insufficient Evidence to Establish an Easement by Estoppel
Through Mr. Hall or His Predecessors-In-Interest.

As previously set forth in Peterson's original brief, easement by estoppel is an
equitable remedy that is to be employed when injustice can be avoided only by the
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creation of such an easement and the following elements are established by a
preponderance of the evidence: 1) the owner or occupiers of the subject land permitted
another to use that land; 2) under circumstances in which it was reasonable to foresee that
the user would substantially change position believing that the pern1ission would not be
revoked; and 3) the user did substantially change position in reasonable reliance on that
belief. Intermountain Res., ?LC v. Jorgenson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112566, *12-13.

Mr. Hall attempts to "crudely" summarize the elements as 1) permission by
owner, 2) reasonable foreseeability by owner, 3) reasonable reliance by user, 4)
substantial chang~ in circumstance, and 5) necessity to avoid injustice to user. However,
the elements of easement by estoppel cannot be so crudely summarized, as such
simplification fails to necessitate the same level of evidence necessary to establish the
elements of easement by estoppel as set forth in Intermountain Res., LLC v. Jorgenson.

Id. A review of the marshaled evidence_ in_ the light most favorableto_ Hall and the_ three.
elements of easement by estoppel shows that there is not sufficient evidence to establish
an easement by estoppel for Hall or his predecessors-in-interest.

1.

There was Insufficient Evidence at Trial to Support an
Easement by Estoppel to Diversified Marketing.

~

Hall attempts to use the words of the trial court to support his position.
Specifically when the trial court stated, "It would be hard for [Peterson] not to know [the
road] wasn't being built," and "the time to have done something would have been at [the
time Diversified built the road.]" [AB at 30]. However, there was no evidence to support
the claim that Diversified built the Road. While the evidence, taken in a light most

~
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(it,

favorable to Hall, suggests that the spur road was built with machinery, who built the
Road remains unsupported by the evidence. The only evidence to suggest Diversified
built the Road was the testimony of Hall who was not born at the time and relied on
USGS maps to determine when it was built. [R.820 at 132:2-10, 213:18-214:16].
The first element to consider in making an easement by estoppel determination is
permission. Despite Hall's attempts to marshal "reasonable inferences" to support the'
element of permission, the evidence fails to establish enough facts from which the jury
could infer permission to use the Road was granted to Diversified, whether express or
implied. As previously explained, the evidence marshaled by Hall was speculation and
conjecture rendering it a guess or mere possibility.
While Smith did testify to seeing a bulldozer south of his property on land
Diversified claimed, an inference of permission to use the Road cannot be made from
such statement. [R.801 at 54:5-14]. There was no indication of where the property was in
relation to the Road, how the bulldozer got to the property, or who was responsible for
getting the bulldozer to the location.
Assuming arguendo, even if Peterson had provided permission for Diversified to
use the Road across the Peterson Property, it was not reasonable for Peterson to foresee
Diversified would substantially change position based upon such permission. Hall argues
there is a reasonable inference that Diversified used the Road heavily while developing
and marketing the property south of the Peterson Property and that as a result of the
heavy use and otherwise landlocked status of the property it was reasonable for the jury
to find that Peterson would not revoke his permission to use the Road. As previously
17
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addressed, heavy usage of the Road by Diversified is mere speculation. Furthermore, the
landlocked status does not make it reasonable for the jury to find Peterson would not
revoke permission to use the Road. The prope11y was landlocked with no road access
from the time it was purchased. [R.822 at 32:24-33:7].
Lastly, Diversified made no substantial change based upon reasonable reliance
that permission would not be revoked. To demonstrate a substantial change Hall argues
that Diversified made investments knowing the Road was the only access to its property.
[AB at 31-32]. However, there was no evidence of a substantial investment on the part of
Diversified. In fact, there was no evidence that any develop~ent occurred. Based on this
information, an easement by estoppel cannot be established by Diversified.
2.

There was Insufficient Evidence at Trial to Establish an
Easement by Estoppel Through Smith, Thomas or Gobel.

The evidence presented at trial failed to support the first element of easement by
estoppel as it pertained to Smith, Thomas and Gobel. Specifically, there was no evidence
or reasonable inference therefrom that Peterson granted them permission, express or
implied, to use the Road across the Peterson Property. In Hall's own brief he does not
allege that any of the parties received permission themselves, but rather relies upon the
alleged permission granted to Diversified. [See generally AB at 32-35].
With regard to the second element, whether it was reasonable for Peterson to
foresee Hall's predecessors-in-interest would substantially change position believing that
pennission would not be revoked, Hall again relies solely upon speculative inferences.
He specifically argues it was a reasonable conclusion that Peterson could foresee that
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~

..\

vJ

purchasers in Diversified's development would substantially change their position
believing that Peterson would not close off the one Road that provided road access to
their property. [AB at 32-365]. However, as Jorgenson stated, three-fourths of the lots
sold by Diversified have no road access. [R.802 at 33:21-24]. Thus, such conclusion is
not reasonable. Additionally, Smith is the only predecessor-in-interest who testified to
having any knowledge that a road existed prior to purchasing or being deeded parcels of
land and even he only used the Road one time, if at all, prior to purchasing the parcel of
land. [See generally R.802 at 113:10-127:10, 49:7-59:20]. It would not have been

v,

reasonable for Peterson to foresee Smith changing his position based upon a single use.
Assuming the Court finds that permission was provided to Hall's· predecessors-ininterest to use the Road, the evidence is insufficient as to the third element, a substantial
change in position in reasonable reliance that permission would not be revoked. Mr. Hall
argues that both Smith and Thomas reasonably relied on the Road because they used the
Road to access their property. However, the parties' mere reliance does not satisfy the
third element. The third element requires a substantial change in position based upon
reliance that the permission to use the Road would not be revoked. Smith may have
driven up to the property one time with Diversified prior to purchasing his lot. However,
there is no evidence that he purchased the property on the basis that he would be able to
use that road. He was not even sure if he drove to the property prior to purchasing it.
[R.801 at 56:23-58:2]. Accordingly, he certainly did not change his position based upon a

~

reasonable belief that he would be able to use the Road. Additionally, statements made by
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Diversified to Smith regarding their intentions of development are irrelevant to Smith's
reasonable reliance that Peterson would not revoke permission to use the Road.
With regard to Thomas' substantial change, Hall alleges that it is reasonable to
infer that Thomas would not have accepted the deeded parcels as payment if they did not
have access and therefore she relied on that access. [AB at 35-36]. However, such claim
is entirely speculative. There is nothing in the Record from which to determine Thomas
even knew the location of the parcels prior to them being deeded to her. In fact, the
Record is clear that she did not go to the property until after she was deeded the parcels
~

ofland. [R.821 at 115:9-17].
Lastly, with respect to the two parcels previously owned by Gobel, Hall alleges
that due to Diversified's purchase of 1550 acres south of the Peterson Property, the jury
could infer that the two lots owned by Gobel were within the boundaries ofDiversified's
___ development. [AB.33-34]._However,-such_inference_is entirely.unreasonable.. Simply.___ _
because someone owns property in a particular area does not mean that they own all of
the property in that area. Hall failed to produce any evidence at trial as to the prior
ownership of the Gobel parcels. In fact, there was no evidence presented regarding the
two Gobel parcels with the exception of Hall's testimony that he purchased them from
Gobel.
DATED this the 26 th day of February, 2016.
HANSEN WRIGHT
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